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FOREIGN COMPANIES AND U.S. SECURITIES
MARKETS IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION
Richard C. Breeden*
I was very grateful to have the invitation to participate in this
program. I had the great pleasure several times as Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to come to
Fordham Law School to participate in colloquia on various sub-
jects relating to the evolution of the securities laws and world
capital markets. Fordham represents a great resource to the City
of New York and, more importantly, to the capital markets of
New York, which is of course the pre-eminent capital market in
the world. It hasbeen a delight in the past to be with you, and I
would only encourage you to continue to play the role that you
have played in examining issues like we are discussing today, and
to continue to be a force for intellectual examination, as well as
for practical understanding, of the workings of markets. You
need to continue helping those of us who are in the capital busi-
ness to find better ways to run markets to serve the economic
needs of peoples around the world.
We live in an era of seemingly constant change - in our
politics, our technology, and our economic life. Things that
once seemed constant and immutable, like the economic success
of Germany and Japan or the supremacy of IBM, may be
changed quite suddenly. Today there is not any country or com-
pany so large or so powerful that it can afford to remain locked
in time if it wants to survive and prosper. Flexibility and adapta-
bility have become essential skills for dealing with our world.
Hopefully that fundamental fact will not be lost on the
House of Representatives later today when it votes on whether to
approve the NAFTA Treaty and create the world's largest free
trading zone with a commitment to maintaining an open, com-
petitive, and entrepreneurial economy in North America. If the
United States of America ever loses its self-confidence and will-
ingness to face competition from around the world, whoever
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comes and whatever may, if we ever get to the point where we
are willing only to seek to guard a shrinking pie and not face
competition, then it will be a sad day for our country.
NAFTA, I think, clearly delineates a fault line between those
who are willing to face the future with self-confidence and will-
ing to compete vigorously and those who want to cling to the
echoes of the past. I can only hope that the momentum that
seems to have been running toward passage of NAFTA, which I
very strongly believe is the right direction, continues through the
critical point, which is when people stop making predictions and
start voting.
At the same time that our economy is afloat on a sea of
change, there are enduring values and certain fundamental
truths that can serve as our compass in navigating the turbulent
waters of change. These values often differ sharply between dif-
ferent countries and cultures, even where they share many other
beliefs in common. For example, the cultural concept of the
collective good (or "wa") that was embedded in Japan's constitu-
tion in the 7th century, and that remains a key part of Japanese
society today, is totally different in orientation from the "inalien-
able rights" of the individual that are set forth as "self-evident
truths" in the American 18th century Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Notwithstanding such a fundamental difference in out-
look on the roles of the individual and society, the United States
and Japan have many issues on which we work closely together
and see eye to eye on, and many values that we share, as well as
areas in which we differ. That, I think, is a good demonstration
of the fact that each society must define for itself its values and
principles, and these shared values help provide the glue that
holds a society together and gives it a sense of shared identity.
If I can telescope what I am going to say today, it is that
every major company in the world ought to want to participate
in the U.S. capital market or at a minimum to have the capacity
to do so. Having the ability to issue securities in the U.S. market
is something that every CFO and every CEO around the world
ought to want to have, as that flexibility can represent a major
corporate asset.
But the issue we are talking about is far more than a ques-
tion of how many listings we can get this year or next if we tweak
the rules this way or that way. It isn't about the profitability of
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the New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ or the other Amer-
ican exchanges. Happily that profitability is higher than it has
ever been, and hopefully it will stay that way. The issue isn't
about how many deals the brokers have to offer this month or
next month, and it is not a question of arcane accounting detail.
It is not even a question of lawyers loving to torment people with
detailed rules and regulations, as we so often do. Rather, this
issue of the conditions under which foreign securities may be
sold to the retail investing public is an issue of values and funda-
mental principles. Needless to say, the question of what the gov-
erning principles underlying the operation of the market ought
to be is terribly important.
Whether we are in academia, in government, in the ac-
counting and legal professions, or in business, in whatever our
respective capacities, we all recognize that we live in a world of
change, and that we have to be prepared in our organization to
accept change. The tough decision is knowing which change to
adopt, and when, because while some change may be essential,
other change may be counter-productive. Knowingjust when to
bend, just when to get up and change your chair and move
around the room, and when to hold fast to things that you have
traditionally done, those are the tough questions. They call for
judgment; they call for experience. And, frankly, honest and
reasonable people can differ quite strongly about them because
they are matters of judgment. There is no cut-and-dry "right"
answer.
As strongly as I believe in the principles that led me to fol-
low a certain set of policies at the SEC, and as strongly as others
may feel on the other side of the issue, the fact of the matter is
that we are all trying to find the way that is best for the future.
We would all like to see healthy, successful capital markets in the
United States and, I think, we would all like to see companies
around the world have the lowest possible cost of capital. The
question is, what's the best way to achieve that? How do we get
from here to there?
While many things are changing in today's global economic
competition, one enduring fact is that it takes plenty of money to
run a successful company in any country. Companies consume
capital voraciously to enhance productivity, to respond to com-
petitive opportunities, and, sometimes, to absorb losses from
risk-taking. While the demand for capital is rising sharply
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around the world due to many factors, including changes in the
geo-political atmosphere, for many companies the availability of
traditional sources of capital has changed significantly and has
narrowed.
Because of inherent economic efficiencies, credit is increas-
ingly being channeled through open capital markets rather than
through an intermediate credit decision by a lender. Indeed, it
is, I think, quite striking that on a net basis the last "commercial
and industrial" or "C&I" (corporate non-real estate) loan in the
United States was made in early 1989. There has not been a
single dollar of net C&I lending to the corporate sector in the
United States since that time. Notjust a lot of our financing, but
all of our financing in the aggregate for running major U.S. cor-
porations is now coming through the capital markets.
That is, of course, not to say that banks aren't participating
just as actively as they ever did in that area; they're just doing it
in a different form, providing credit through the purchase of
securities rather than through that traditional vehicle known as
the commercial loan. Thus, the "loan department" has become
the "capital markets group." This trend has been going on not
only in the United States, but almost everywhere around the
world.
Indeed, one of the things that is both most striking and
most encouraging about the trends in world capital markets has
been the rapid growth of the "emerging securities markets"
around the world. Here we have seen very rapid growth in the
capacity of countries to develop capital market systems and to
make the economic benefits of those systems available to compa-
nies in their local market as well as having access to global mar-
kets.
Even in Germany and Japan (though for very different rea-
sons), the traditional system of relationships is changing be-
tween a universal bank in Germany, and the companies in which
it holds equity stakes, and the "main bank" in Japan and its rela-
tionship to a group of companies within a keiretsu. The German
banks have been fairly quiet about it, but nonetheless the steps
of Deutsche Bank and others to reduce the size of their indus-
trial equity holdings suggests the beginning of a profound
change in the capital market systems of Germany.
On the whole, the trend towards the use of securities mar-
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kets to finance businesses around the world should be seen as a
pretty big plus for U.S. competitiveness, because we happen to
have both the largest and by far the most efficient and innovative
securities market in the world. The immense liquidity of the
U.S. securities market is today absorbing issuances of new securi-
ties with a value of more than U.S.$1 trillion per year. Looking
at a few of the IPO offering documents, I sometimes wish that
the market was absorbing a slightly lower dollar amount because
some of the deals appear to be the product of exuberance rather
than an analysis. Nonetheless, that's the market at work, and
who is to say what securities people ought to be interested in
buying so long as there was good disclosure and full information
on all sides?
That sum of primary offerings, that U.S.$1 trillion plus in
capital being raised in the U.S. market through securities offer-
ings, probably exceeds the sum total of the primary offerings
that are taking place in every other market in the world put to-
gether. Now, it is true that many markets are very active and
successful secondary trading markets. The U.S. markets have
plenty of strong competition when it comes to markets for secon-
dary trading. But if you look at the capital markets picture from
the perspective of primary offerings and where capital is actually
raised by companies for productive purposes on an annual basis,
there the U.S. lead - the reason why the U.S. markets are at-
tractive, because of the ready availability of capital - is quite
dramatic.
For my own part I would be happy to see our lead in that
area narrow, because I think the spread of more efficient and
more liquid markets around the world is not a negative for the
United States, but rather a positive. Growing foreign securities
markets will help to strengthen economies all around the world,
and a growing world GDP is very much in the interest of the
United States. This is particularly true since our economic fu-
ture lies in international trade, exports, and the international
marketplace.
There are many factors that contribute to this extraordinary
liquidity of U.S. securities markets. I won't go through them all,
but it might not surprise you terribly to know that in the opinion
of this former Chairman of the SEC, the most important factor
of all is strong public confidence in the honesty and integrity of
the U.S. market.
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Public confidence in the market is an essential attribute.
People do not participate in markets where they think they are
likely to get cheated. Some economists will tell you, "Prices will
all reflect this. We can repeal all the laws and the companies can
go out, and if they choose to cheat the investors, their stock
price will adjust accordingly." I think the factor they have diffi-
culty measuring is the loss of liquidity for everybody - the hon-
est and the dishonest companies. When people decide the game
is rigged, they will simply choose to go and play a different game.
From the ruins of the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depres-
sion we have managed to build arduously a system (notwith-
standing occasional shocks to public confidence) of extraordi-
nary confidence in the fundamental integrity of the U.S. market.
That, ladies and gentlemen, has produced one critical thing:
participation. People put their 401-Ks in the market, they put
their discretionary money in the market, they put their kids' col-
lege education in the market, they put their very economic fu-
ture in the market. The only reason they are willing to do that is
because they have some confidence that the game is a fair one.
That confidence is what is ultimately at stake in the issues we are
discussing today.
I believe that the public confidence we enjoy is in part a
direct result of the SEC's system of disclosure. Part of it is also a
reflection of market forces for disclosure. It is also a reflection
of the SEC's capacity to enforce the disclosure rules vigorously
and effectively. Indeed, it is striking that when you look around
the world at other securities commissions, almost all of them
have the power to write disclosure rules - and there are some
beautiful disclosure rules in place in countries around the world.
However, I do not believe that any other major securities com-
mission in the world has the power, on its own, to enforce disclo-
sure rules and to seek judicial sanctions against those who diso-
bey the rules. The U.S. success rate in bringing to justice compa-
nies that have chosen to ignore the requirements is dramatically
better than that of other markets around the world, and that I
think contributes to this sense of overall confidence.
During the last four years, there has been a wave of new
foreign companies coming to the U.S. market to sell securities.
Since October of 1989, when I became Chairman, more than
250 foreign companies have entered the U.S. public markets for
the first time. That is an average of two or three new companies
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entering the United States for the first time every week. I sus-
pect Richard Kosnik in his presentation will give us an updated
total, but in any event the volume of foreign companies entering
the U.S. market has been immense, notwithstanding the rhetoric
from some quarters to the contrary. In fact, since 1989, foreign
issuers have raised over U.S.$100 billion in capital in the U.S.
public market. Strikingly, during this period of time, 1989-93,
the number of foreign companies listed in London, Tokyo,
Paris, and Frankfurt all declined.
It is interesting that as part of this debate about competitive-
ness, proponents of abolishing the U.S. disclosure system keep
holding up London as an example, saying, "We've got to com-
pete with London." In fact, the number of foreign companies
listed in London is often a bit overstated, because many of the
foreign companies listed in London are from various former
British colonies and dependencies. No matter what our rules
might be, it's not very likely that we will have eighty-five South
African companies trading in the United States.
Even if you put aside the historic factors that result in nu-
merous companies from former British colonies being listed for
trading in the London market, the number of foreign partici-
pants in the U.S. market is growing at a vastly greater pace than
is true in London or any other major market. That is not opin-
ion, but fact.
Some say that we should jettison those quaint, antiquated,
useless, out-dated, obsolete, unproductive, overly burdensome,
un-economic, thoughtless rules and requirements of the SEC,
and that it's time to get rid of this horse and buggy in the era of
global technology. Well, let me respectfully disagree. I don't
think that anything about our improved communications or
more global trading systems have made honesty and integrity
less important. Therefore, this is not the time to get rid of our
fundamental commitment to the protection of investors, to the
integrity of the market, to honesty in disclosure, or to openness
in financial reporting. The United States has an important
global role in helping to promote the growth of efficient global
capital markets. As part of that role, we should never limit the
availability of the U.S. capital market solely to U.S. companies.
By the same token, we should establish the principles under
which all companies, foreign and domestic, must operate if they
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wish to raise funds in the public market. These principles in-
clude matters as fundamental as honesty and integrity. To avoid
exactly such an approach of even-handed protection of inves-
tors, some fear-mongers preach that the U.S. markets are in dan-
ger of becoming quaint anachronisms with at best regional sig-
nificance. That argument is both false and disingenuous. In
reality, the only thing that could produce that result would be a
substantial loss of public confidence in the market that could
lead to loss of the market's liquidity. Incidentally, the idea that
any market you want to look at in the United States is on the
verge of regional obsolescence is pretty silly, whether one is talk-
ing about the market for potato chips, computers, or almost any-
thing else you can name. That doesn't mean we can afford to be
complacent. Being successful in international competition will
still require much hard work to maintain an edge in technology,
efficiency, and most important, quality for the investor.
We also need to be flexible. Just because we have done
something for a long time doesn't mean we should continue do-
ing it. Along with everybody else, the SEC has to be willing to
roll up its sleeves and find a flexible approach to the needs of an
increasingly diverse group of issuers in today's capital markets.
Re-examining rules for offerings by small companies, simplifying
disclosure rules, demystifying global market making restrictions,
facilitating the pooling of savings, accommodating new tech-
niques like structured financing and many others are examples
of areas we pursued at the SEC to seek to improve flexibility and
reduce unnecessary regulatory costs. In that endeavor I hope
our record was a good one.
I know my successor is determined to follow the same ap-
proach, to try and find ways to lower the cost, and to remove
unnecessary burdens for anyone seeking to enter the U.S. capital
market. That commitment, however, to lower burdens that are
unnecessary is very different from having a sense of panic that
we will suddenly and inexplicably become an irrelevant market if
we don'tjettison the very core fundamental principles of our sys-
tem.
Therefore, I would submit, the truth is that the U.S. capital
markets are today the most successful markets in the world, and
the model that emerging markets around the world are emulat-
ing. We should remember what brought us to the enviable posi-
tion of having more investors, more liquidity and more foreign
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offerings than any other market. The key to that success was a
deep-seated, fundamental commitment to providing the investor
with the highest possible quality of information and an unshak-
able commitment to openness and integrity in the market. If
anything, more complex and international markets make those
principles much more important than they have ever been.
In 1992, ninety-four new foreign companies entered the
U.S. market for the first time, offering U.S.$32 billion in securi-
ties. This year so far there have been seventy-six new foreign
entrants, and we have seen around U.S.$40 billion in offerings in
the first ten months. As of early November, the securities of 562
foreign companies from forty countries trade in the public mar-
kets of the United States, representing every continent except
the Antarctic. If John Dingle hadn't been harassing me about
my foreign travel, I would have gone to the Antarctic looking for
a company to come and list in the U.S. market. In fact, there
were a number of people who would have liked to have send me
to the Antarctic to stay.
Seriously, no other market has been seeing the growth in
numbers of foreign issuers that we have been achieving every year.
So, I think you have to ask "If you're scoring a touchdown every
time your team gets its hands on the ball, is that the time to
radically change the rules of the game?" I submit not. You
mustn't be complacent, but you must be doing something right
or else you wouldn't have achieved the record that's there for all
to see.
In early October, Daimler-Benz AG became the first Ger-
man company to become publicly traded in the United States.
That was an event of immense significance, because Daimler-
Benz is the largest manufacturer in Europe, and by any measure
it is a truly global company of the highest stature. In addition, a
German company had never before entered the U.S. public mar-
ket, and there are more differences between U.S. GAAP and U.S.
disclosure rules and those of Germany than with any other coun-
try. Indeed, in terms of disclosure and investor protection as vi-
sualized in the United States, Germany represents the exact op-
posite end of the spectrum.
To me, the Daimler-Benz listing seems to demonstrate
much of the new thinking that's going on in corporate board
rooms around the world with respect to how global companies
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ought to approach issues of accounting, disclosure and their
sources of capital. It also demonstrates, that some companies
are blessed with superb management that is capable of meeting
the challenges of our world head-on, especially when equipped
with the capital markets' equivalent of airbags and antilock
brakes.
There are undoubtedly many reasons why German compa-
nies had never sought to raise capital in the U.S. market. With a
German savings rate far higher than that of the United States,
very strong profits, and a pervasive role of the German banks,
most German companies had access to abundant quantities of
capital within Germany. Perhaps that helps explain why there
are only about 600 publicly traded companies in Germany, about
10% of the number of publicly traded companies in India. More
importantly, only sixteen German companies have listed their
stock in any market outside Germany, even those markets with
no rules.
Though many factors have been involved, in the case of
German companies, accounting rules in the United States have
unquestionably been viewed in Germany as a significant prob-
lem. Accounting rules in Germany give a company wide latitude
in how it chooses to portray current earnings or financial condi-
tions. German practices allow companies the ability both to un-
derstate and to overstate earnings substantially.
Many German companies took the common position with
the SEC, namely, that they'd be happy to list in the United
States, contingent on the SEC capitulating to a demand from
these companies that they should be completely exempted from
all auditing, accounting, and disclosure standards that are ap-
plied to the 12,000 publicly traded U.S. companies and to the
nearly 600 foreign companies that are publicly traded in the
United States. The German argument was that America, and
presumably every other country, should allow German compa-
nies to go door to door in the United States selling their securi-
ties to the general public, based solely on German law and prac-
tice. This would be a little bit like saying that an American insur-
ance company ought to be able to go door to door among
apartment houses in Munich selling single-premium deferred
annuities and obeying only the laws of Wisconsin. I hardly think
that would be tolerated there, and it's a strange proposition to
be followed here.
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But having convinced themselves and various ill-informed
German government officials of the desirability of this position,
they nonetheless proceeded to batter at the doors of the SEC
loudly demanding a free pass, which they conveniently dubbed a
"system of reciprocity." This, I am afraid to say, received less
than the most enthusiastic reception at the SEC. That lack of
enthusiasm on our part was not due to anything respecting the
particular companies, because the ones who were approaching
us were unquestionably fine companies that many investors in
the United States would like to consider owning. Clearly, the
SEC also had a desire to see those shares available for trading
here in the United States.
However, the long-standing approach of the SEC is one of
national treatment. Indeed, that is also the approach of the U.S.
government to every single area of finance of which I am aware.
Whether the issue is the application of Glass-Steagall, interstate
banking, insurance law, the Bank Holdings Company Act, the
Commodity Exchange Act, or the securities laws, the United
States has accorded national treatment to foreign firms partici-
pating in the U.S. market. National treatment is also normally
the best treatment you can aspire to, since in many countries
U.S. and other foreign firms often are forced to operate under
restrictions that formally or informally do not apply to the host
country competitors. Few if any countries give foreign firms a
substantial preference over their domestic companies in the
same field.
Thus, in the SEC's traditional view, if Ford and A&T are
required to make a particular type of disclosure, such as the dis-
closure of their results by segment or the liabilities that they may
have for retirement benefits, then a foreign company seeking to
sell stock to individual investors in Ohio, California, or Florida
should be subject to the same requirements - neither better
nor worse. By the same token, if a particular area of disclosure is
too burdensome for foreign companies, the rules should be
modified to give relief to U.S. firms along with their foreign
competitors.
This commitment to treating foreign and domestic firms
equally was not due to a belief that U.S. GAAP is uniquely in-
sightful or pristinely accurate. U.S. GAAP has many flaws, and I
suggested several areas that needed an overhaul - to the con-
sternation of some who opposed reporting the market value of
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Treasury bond portfolios. Rather than reflect a belief that U.S.
GAAP is a perfect body of wisdom, the SEC's desire was to avoid
giving either foreign or domestic companies an advantage in
raising capital. In addition, we also believed that high standards
of transparency in financial reporting enhanced the efficiency of
the overall market.
National treatment is followed not only in finance, but in
most matters of international trade. If a German company
builds a factory in South Carolina, it cannot do so under the
German Clear Air Act; it will be governed by the Clean Air Act of
the United States. The employees in that assembly plant in
South Carolina would work under U.S. labor law, not that of
Germany. Assuming the transfer pricing was accurate and the
plant generated net income, that income would be taxed under
the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, not under the
tax laws of Germany. Thus, it is quite natural in my view that if
the same German company wants to finance construction of that
plant in South Carolina by selling stock to retired school teach-
ers in Illinois, it ought to be required to do so under U.S. law,
and not that of Germany. Incidentally, as all of you know, when
British orJapanese executives come to the United States to man-
age a facility, we make them drive on the right side of the road.
Even though at home they do it differently, we believe that na-
tional treatment is the only way to maintain highway safety.
Aside from the overall interest of equality and the general
application of national treatment, the SEC's requirements for
making full disclosure and providing a "reconciliation" of for-
eign financial statements to U.S. GAAP are designed to achieve
several fundamental objectives.
First, the principle I've already mentioned is to avoid preju-
dicing U.S. companies in their own home market. If the rules
for disclosure are fair for Ford Motor Company, they should be
fair for Daimler-Benz. And if we're going to reduce burdens
from rules that might be too onerous, than we ought to make a
change applicable to both domestic and foreign companies.
Substantial differentials in disclosure policies, accounting princi-
ples or auditing standards could leave U.S. firms at a competitive
disadvantage by disclosing more than their competitors, as well
as at a significant cost disadvantage.
Second, the policy in the United States has long been to
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allow investors to compare companies rationally across industries
and irrespective of geography. By requiring all companies to
present their results in either the U.S. GAAP format or to pro-
vide a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, the SEC gives the investor
the capacity to compare an investment in Intel or Microsoft with
an investment in Sony or British Aerospace in a meaningful
manner. Of course foreign financial statements reconciled to
U.S. GAAP does not make the financial statements exactly com-
parable to a U.S. company, but the data is available to make
meaningful comparisons. That promotes investor understand-
ing and an efficient market. Some assert that information really
disclosed in a foreign market in the United States is irrelevant,
because the home market (and information available there)
drives the price of the stock worldwide. While an interesting ar-
gument, that case has really ever been established. In addition,
it ignores at least two additional factors. First, some foreign
stocks have greater trading volume in the United States than in
their home market. In a few cases, the stock isn't even publicly
traded in the home country. Second, information that must be
disclosed in the United States will also be disclosed in the home
market, so that better price discovery can occur in home as well
as offshore markets.
By contrast, if the SEC were to adopt a system of home
country exemptions, then U.S. investors would be confronted
even today with financial statements prepared under at least
forty different sets of accounting principles. That approach ac-
tually has been tried in the past, and the results are chronicled
in the Bible in the story of the Tower of Babel. In short, current
policy creates a uniform information bridge that helps let inves-
tors compare companies from any country and enhances the
transparency and efficiency of markets around the world. The
SEC's willingness to insist on the bright sunshine of disclosure
helps provide a long term foundation for worldwide market
growth based on economic fundamentals. The contrary ap-
proach of allowing a race to the bottom in disclosure would pro-
mote markets driven more by speculation, since investors and
analysts wouldn't have the ability to consider economic funda-
mentals.
The third, and most important objective is the pursuit of
investor protection through transparent financial reporting and
full and complete disclosure. That isn't a regulatory nuisance,
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but rather it's a fundamental principle that, if you want to use
the public's money, you must be prepared to tell the public
truthfully how you're doing. While some countries may seek to
maximize issuer convenience, the U.S. system at its core is built
on an uncompromising dedication to the needs of the investor,
not the issuer. In this case, what is at stake is a competitive strat-
egy on the part of the United States to offer investors worldwide
the highest quality product.
Indeed, the proposal of one of our securities exchanges to
abolish quality standards for information disclosure involves a
striking echo of the approach taken by other industries in the
United States in the past (including the U.S. automakers in the
1960's and 1970's) of deciding to lower quality standards in the
search for higher short term profits. Of course the result of a
strategy of planned mediocrity has generally been sharply falling
market share as consumers turn to others for higher quality
products. In fact, I'm not aware of any industry in any country
that has profited in international competition by deliberately
lowering the quality of its product. Yet that is exactly what the
United States is being urged to do in throwing its disclosure stan-
dards out the window. From the perspective of investors, the
result would be for the U.S. market to turn away from its current
status of unmatched quality of disclosure to a policy of murky
disclosure easily matched or exceeded by other markets. That
would undercut the competitiveness of our markets, not pro-
mote it.
Beyond the issue of mere disclosure is the question of prin-
ciples and values that may be most important. In a very real
sense the U.S. disclosure system embodies our belief in openness
and equality, and that belief is one we not only apply to our
political system but also to the corporate world as well. America
is an open society. It is founded on the principle that is a won-
derful disinfectant and that people ought to be prepared to con-
duct their affairs out in the open where society can judge them.
The management of companies that are owned by public share-
holders are required to disclose not only the company's financial
performance, but also a wealth of detail concerning its plans,
operations, risks and prospects. That disclosure is a burden, but
we see it as an essential element in the accountability of officers
to the people who own the company. The benefits of that ac-
countability in the aggregate far exceed the costs of disclosure.
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Beyond mere cost-benefit considerations, however, there is a
larger principle at stake in seeking to prevent misuse of power
and to promote accountability for performance, and these
would not be possible without the openness that is the hallmark
of the U.S. system. When it comes to the commitment to an
open system, our society is considerably different than many
other systems around the world. But, ladies and gentlemen, we
cannot be some other society. We have to be true to ourselves.
Here the specific case of Daimler-Benz provides an interest-
ing demonstration of how two very different approaches to these
issues reflect the principles that underlie accounting and disclo-
sure policies. Under German accounting policies, companies
are allowed great latitude to create so-called "hidden reserves,"
or what are sometimes known in the accounting world as "provi-
sions." When a company is making high levels of profit, income
reported to investors can be reduced by creating generous
reserves or provisions for potential future adverse events. Under
U.S. GAAP, an adverse event must be probable and estimable in
amount before a reserve may be booked. Under German GAAP,
a company may book reserves largely without restriction, and
German companies do so freely. In the future, if the company is
incurring losses or low profits, the company may determine that
some or all of its provisions for future adversity are no longer
needed, and it can then release its reserves into current income
in a manner that masks current losses. At one time, roughly
forty percent of the entire balance sheet of Daimler-Benz was
represented by the single line item, "provisions."
Though its sales had plummeted in the face of a steep
downturn in Germany's economy, for the first half of 1993
Daimler-Benz reported a profit under German GAAP of almost
DM200 million, a terrific result given the state of the German
economy. However, this reported DM200 million profit came
after an undisclosed release of more than DM1.5 billion in provi-
sions into income. Under German GAAP, the story for investors
would have ended at the DM200 million profit, though its board
members and its largest shareholder, the Deutsche Bank, would
have known about the results of the company before adding
back the provisions from prior years.
For the same period under U.S. GAAP, the company re-
ported a loss of just under DM1 billion. That fact is clearly
shown in a two-page reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, where the ad-
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dition of reserves earned in prior periods is simply backed out of
the current year's results, along with other changes. Thus, all
the investors in Daimler-Benz, but only a favored few in other
German companies, are now able to evaluate the company's cur-
rent performance without the considerable layer of camouflage
that other German companies are allowed to use to smooth out
their reported earnings. Since the top managers of German
banks routinely sit as board members of German companies, the
banks have access to far superior financial information than non-
insiders. Once Germany enacts legislation outlawing insider
trading, having such a disparity of information and being major
players in securities trading markets may create considerable ex-
posure for Germany's banks that would be reduced by better
public disclosure.
Interestingly, the announcement by Daimler-Benz that it
was going to reconcile its financial statements to U.S. GAAP
seems to have caused its stock to rise in comparison with other
German companies, providing an interesting demonstration of
the value the market places on openness and transparency. In-
deed, from the announcement by Daimler-Benz that it would list
in the United States until the actual secondary offering, Daimler-
Benz's stock out-performed the DAX average in Germany by al-
most 5%, and if you back Daimler-Benz out of the DAX, by even
more. That represents billions of dollars in additional market
capitalization that may be directly attributable to its willingness
to remove the camouflage from its financial results. Daimler-
Benz has been subjected to criticism in some quarters for this
decision to break the united front of German companies and to
"give in" to the SEC. This is both untrue and quite farfetched.
Daimler-Benz approached this issue not as some sort of
hockey game between the United States and Germany, but as an
important business issue that is directly related to its overall
global business strategy. The company perceived that there was
substantial economic value to it of having multiple sources of
capital in major world markets. Indeed, it followed its an-
nouncement that it was going to list its stock in the United States
with notice that it was also planning to list its shares in both Sin-
gapore and Shanghai.
Just as any prudent company would arrange multiple
sources of supply for indispensable raw materials or component
parts, Daimler-Benz sees considerable value in assuring that the
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company has the capacity to finance its activities in multiple mar-
kets around the world. Where the conditions are substantially
more attractive in one market than in another, Daimler-Benz
wants to have the flexibility to shift rapidly its source of funds to
obtain the lowest overall cost. Leaving a company dependent on
limited sources of capital or exposed to higher costs of capital
than readily available to competitors is a dangerous decision on
the part of any management group. Indeed, when you consider
the level of German interest rates compared to those in the
United States during recent times, some companies seem to be
paying a very steep price for staying out of the U.S. market.
Underlying the decision of Daimler-Benz was a fundamental
long-term view that a truly global company must not only sell its
products around the world, but it also must develop a global
ownership base. Daimler-Benz saw the existence of an informed
international investor base with confidence in its understanding
of the company's financial picture as a significant corporate as-
set. Here the Chief Financial Officer, Dr. Gerhard Liener, asked
an extremely thoughtful question at a New York press confer-
ence: "Why shouldn't Daimler-Benz care as much about the
quality of information the company provides to its owners as it
does about the quality of the products it supplies to its custom-
ers?" What he correctly perceived was that in today's world, both
a strong global customer base and a strong global ownership
base are critical corporate assets.
In changing its information disclosure policies and deciding
to subject itself to the discipline of full disclosure to the market,
Daimler-Benz made a gutsy decision. That decision was predi-
cated on what management believed was in the long-term inter-
ests of its shareholders and its employees. That decision embod-
ied the proposition that it was a global company headquartered
in Germany, and that a global company has to be prepared to do
business in the major markets of the world. Where that means
learning how to do business Under someone else's language,
someone else's laws, someone else's culture or traditions, then
so be it; that is part of the job of being a global company. Cer-
tainly this attitude is essential for success in global sales and mar-
keting of products-perhaps best exemplified by the slogan of
the Swiss/Swedish conglomerate ABB "We're Local Every-
where."
The U.S. disclosure system is'detailed, and complying with it
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requires professional fees. However, those costs are a bit exag-
gerated, and they are greatest on a one-time basis. As Chairman
of the SEC, I received quite a few letters from CEOs of compa-
nies that came to the U.S. market thanking members of the staff
and expressing the view that the company would have taken the
step much earlier if it had really understood the process.
Ironically, the vigor of our debate in the United States
about lessening the burdens for foreign registrants may have the
unfortunate side effect of reinforcing the impression in other
countries that feel that the barriers are really bigger than they
actually happen to be. Indeed, the level of understanding in
many countries among non-registrants concerning the require-
ments for being publicly listed in the United States is extremely
low.
For foreign companies that might be thinking about listing
in the United States, let me offer two observations. One, it is
easier today to offer securities in the U.S. market than it has ever
been. The regulatory attitude of the SEC is one of immense flex-
ibility. They will work actively with companies to find the easiest
possible means of accommodating differences in accounting and
disclosure standards between the registrant's home country prac-
tices and the United States. In addition, the staff will provide
extremely rapid turn around times on documents to enable for-
eign registrants to meet their offering timetable.
Second, the system isn't going to get much easier. If you
are waiting for the towel to be thrown in, if you are waiting for
the rules to be abolished, you may be waiting for a very long
time. While it is strictly a personal opinion, I don't think the
United States is ever going to turn its back on the fundamental
principles of investor protection that have brought us the market
that we enjoy today.
In debating how to build a better and better market, we can-
not forget that there must be an underlying core of principles to
guide the market's evolution. Honesty, integrity, and fair deal-
ing with investors are morally right, and they are principles of
good business too. Here the traditional SEC approach to disclo-
sure is tough, and it is meant to be, because public confidence in
the market is easy to lose and very difficult to restore. Without
investors, there wouldn't have been the U.S.$1.1 trillion in pri-
mary offerings during 1993, and many companies would have
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had smaller and slower growth as a result. Without openness
and truth, and a strong determination to providing full disclo-
sure to the market as a whole rather than to a select few, the risk
of investing would be far higher than it is already, and many in-
vestors wouldn't be willing to participate in the market.
The proposal of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") to
give a "free pass" exempting all so-called "world class" companies
from all U.S. disclosure, accounting and auditing standards was
not a good idea in the first place. It was an understandable at-
tempt to respond to the problem of perceived excessive cost for
registrants, and it is important for the United States to address
any and all negative perceptions about our market-especially,
when they aren't true. Certainly the NYSE, NASD (which
strongly opposed the NYSE proposal), and other groups should
actively discuss how our system can be improved to benefit issu-
ers and investors.
Though we should not be reluctant to discuss the overall
issue, the type of high-profile, high-pressure campaign that has
been waged in favor of the free pass proposal was and is a serious
mistake. It was (and is) a mistake because the proposal itself is a
lousy one. It goes too far, and would represent a cure that would
be vastly worse than the disease, if in fact we have any disease at
all. We have created a high quality environment for investors,
and they have made the U.S. market the most liquid in the
world. The free pass proposal would drive a wrecking ball
through the foundations of the disclosure system, with immense
negative consequences for the openness and efficiency of the
market.
The pressure campaign for the free pass proposal was (and
is) also a mistake because it has an effect, and that effect is
counterproductive. Foreign issuers need to understand that the
current process is more flexible and less costly than they may
have understood. However, the rhetoric in favor of the free pass
would make many people believe the current system is very diffi-
cult to navigate. Furthermore, why should a company incur the
costs and provide the disclosure required by the current process
if there is a significant chance that the free pass plan will be
adopted? Many companies that might otherwise elect to list
could defer that decision in hopes of gaining the free pass.
Over the long run, greater harmonization of accounting
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standards would be beneficial. Reducing the circle disparities in
natural practice should be a high priority, but only where this
can be done within a framework of transparency.
Happily, companies don't have to wait until the promised
day when all the world's accountants get together and agree on
what accounting principles ought to be. That great day might
occur just after all the world's lawyers get together and agree on
a single tax law, a single antitrust law, and a uniform legal code
for other issues.
Since that day might be a long time coming, we are fortu-
nate that there is not any need to sit back and wait until that
glorious day occurs. If Daimler-Benz can build an information
bridge and provide it to investors so that they can make the
cross-over between German accounting and U.S. GAAP, then
any company in the world can do it too. Though not without
cost, the benefits of following a global approach to capital acqui-
sition for any company are immense. This is the best means of
assuring a wide range of financing alternatives, the lowest overall
cost of capital, and the best protection against market interrup-
tions. In today's world, none of us can create certainty, but we
can build financing flexibility and a long-term base of investors
through a global approach to capital. But to be successful, that
strategy has to require a dedication to providing the highest pos-
sible quality of information to the owners of the company and to
providing true long-term shareholder value.
Thank you very much.
